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THE LAW SCHOOL
The one hundred and second year of its existence opens upon the
Law School with a further increase in enrollment. The regis-




Graduate Class .......... 12 13 11
Third Year Class ........ 102 111 106
Second Year Class ....... 101 82 137
First Year Class ........ 75 132 118
Students from other De-
partments of the Uni-
versity ............... 40 70 48
Total .............. 330 408 420
The same necessity of dividing the First Year Class into sec-
tions which was felt last year is again apparent, the total regis-
tered for first year work being more than 150 and a new building
appears as a greater need than ever.
Degrees from 107 different institutions in the United States and
foreign countries are represented in the enrollment for 1925-
1926, and students from forty-four different states of the Union
are at present in attendance at the School. Among the Universi-
ties and Colleges having five or more alumni at the Law School
are Cornell University, 12; Dartmouth College, 5; Georgetown
University, 9; Harvard University, 6; Holy Cross College, 27;
Princeton University, 7; Trinity College, 10; University of Penn-
sylvania, 11; University of Tennessee, 5; Vanderbilt University,
6; Wesleyan University, 6; Yale University, 123.
The 1925 Summer Session demonstrated even more forcibly
than last year's session the popularity of this annual feature, as
the'following comparison of the respective enrollments of the past
two summers will attest:
1924 1925
First Semester ..................... 124 135
Second Semester .................... 115 136
This is the largest summer enrollment which the School has as yet
enjoyed, and was notable in the fact that ten teachers from
other law schools were enrolled, taking the courses leading to
graduate degrees which attendance upon three such sessions
makes possible.
During the past year tvo members of the faculty resigned.
Professor Edmund X. Morgan returned to the Harvard Law
School, from which he graduated; and Associate Professor Karl
N. Llewellyn accepted a professorship in Columbia Law School. In
addition, two of the younger members of the faculty have carried
out their previous intentions and entered into practice, Mr. Daniel
D. Morgan in New Haven, and Mr. John F. Caskey in New York.
The additions to the faculty have brought five new men to New
Haven. Mr. Roscoe B. Turner, a graduate of the College of
Idaho in 1916 and of the Yale Law School in 1920, has been ap-
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pointed as Assistant Professor, teaching the subjects of Sales and
Negotiable Instruments. Mr. Kenneth C. Sears, Professor of
Law at the University of Missouri, is here as Visiting Professor,
and will teach the courses in Agency and Evidence formerly given
by Mr. Edmund Morgan. The course in Trial Practice is being
given this year by Professor Young B. Smith, of Columbia Uni-
versity, who has also accepted a visiting professorship in the Law
School. Pursuing the policy inaugurated last year, the faculty
has added two Teaching Fellows who will pursue courses of gradu-
ate study and do a limited amount of teaching. These men are
Professor Merrill Isaac Schnebly of the University of Indiana,
who will give the courses in Persons and Wills, and Professor
Thomas Edgar Atkinson of the University of North Dakota, who
will be in charge of the course in First Year Procedure and the
briefing work of the law clubs. Mr. Robert M. Hutchins, a
graduate of the Law School in 1925, and Secretary of Yale Uni-
versity, has been appointed a special lecturer for the year, to give
the courses in Public Service Law and Trade Regulation. A new
course, known as the Law of Credit Transactions, which amalga-
mates the major portions of Suretyship, Bankruptcy and Mort-
gages, is now being offered by Professor Sturges.
THE APPLICATION TO INSURANCE CONTRACTS OF THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF SALES LAW
The following situation frequently occurs in insurance litigation.
A policy, issued upon oral application and without inquiry into one
or more of the numberless factors pertinent to the risk, is accepted
by the applicant and filed away without reading. Upon occur-
rence of the loss it is discovered that an express condition prece-
dent to the policy holder's right has not been fulfilled, because of a
state of facts existent and known to the insured at the time of
issue of the policy, but unknown to the insurer by reason of the
agent's failure to ask the questions contained in the usual applica-
tion form. On the insurer's refusal to pay, a suit on the policy
or for its reformation is brought.
Under the familiar law of contracts, developed to meet the aver-
age situation of parties dealing with each other on an equal foot-
ing and hence at arm's length, the plaintiff cannot recover at
common law. The parol evidence rule, founded upon the soundest
principles of policy, is a perfect defense. It works no very great
hardship to hold a man bound by the terms of a written contract
upon his acceptance of the instrument, regardless of whether he
has read it or not. Any other rule would be likely to work great
injustice by opening the door to the very mass of uncertain and
IAnson, Coutracts (Corbin, 4th Am. ed. 1924) sec. 347; 2 Wiffiston, Con-
tracts (1920) sec. 631; 5 Wigmore, EvIdcucc (2d ed. 1923) see. 2400-2478.
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easily falsified oral testimony which the writing was designed to
supplant. It is, moreover, contrary to our ideas of justice that a
man should be allowed to take advantage of the beneficial provi,
sions of a contract and at the same time evade the consequences of
those that are prejudicial. 2 In equity the plaintiff apparently can
expect no greater success. The conventional conception of neither
fraud' nor mutual mistake4 is satisfied by a simple failure of the
insurer to inquire into the facts constituting the non-fulfillment of
a condition or of the insured to notice the express provisions of the
policy.
No relief seems available from the doctrines of waiver and es-
toppel. Waiver, said to be "an intentional relinquishment of a
known right",5 is inapplicable, as the situation lacks the essential
element of knowledge by the insurer (even by its agent) of the
circumstances amounting to a non-fulfillment of a condition.
Estoppel, properly raised only by a misstatement (express or im-
plied) of fact, on which the plaintiff has reasonably relied to his
detriment, is scarcely available, because no statement is to be
inferred that the policy covered the risk for which it was taken
out, since, by hypothesis, the insurer was unaware what that risk
was.
Accordingly not a few courts have held for the insurer in such
cases. 7 Two recent decisions to this effect are Mishiloff V. Amer-
can Central Ins. Co. (1925) 102 Conn. 370, 128 Atl. 33, involving
a suit for reformation of an automobile theft insurance policy
issued to a conditional vendee with the usual condition regarding
"sole and unconditional ownership", and Hardin v. Liverpool &
London & Globe Ins. Co., Ltd. (1925) 189 N. C. 423, 127 S. E. 353,
involving a suit to recover on a fire insurance policy with a similar
condition, issued to a mortgagor on a dwelling house. In the
former case the fact that the policy was "brokeraged" (written by
an "insurance broker", not by the agent of the insurer) furnished
2 Cf. Root, J., dissenting in Neher v. Western Assur. Co. (1905) 40 Wash.
157, 160, 82 Pac. 166, 167.
3 3 Williston, op. cit. supra note 1, at ch. 41, p. 2645.
43 Williston, op. cit. supra note 1, at ch. 42, p. 2728.
rVance, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Law (1925) 34 YAiE LAW
JOURNAL, 834, 846, and cases cited; eleven typical fact situations constitut-
ing waiver are examined, p. 841.
6 Vance, op. cit. supra note 5. The elements of estoppel are discussed at
p. 858; typical fact situations constituting estoppel at p. 857.
7Beck v. Hibernia Ins. Co. (1875) 44 Md. 95; Mers v. Franklin Ins. Go.
(1878) 68 Mo. 127; McFarland v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1891)
46 Minn. 519, 49 N. W. 253; Wilcox v. Continental Ins. Co. (1893) 85 Wis.
193, 55 N. W. 188; Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Bohn (1894, C. 0. A. 8th) 65 Fed.
165; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Holcomb (1896) 89 Tex. 404, 34 S. W. 915; Orient
Ins. Co. v. Williamson (1896) 98 Ga. 464, 25 S..E. 560; Dumas v. North.
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a reason in addition to those in the typical case for holding that
there was no waiver. In each case the court decided in favor of
the insurer after discussing principles and authorities in the cus-
tomary fashion.
A line of cases to the contrary, extending back for half a cen-
tury, for which the prevailing notions of justice in the community
may be responsible, presents a variety of theories upon which
many courts have relied in reaching a contrary result. Some of
the early decisions were apparently based on a misconception of
the factual situation, the courts failing to distinguish the defense
of non-fulfillment of the condition from the then more usual one
of concealment.3 All that these cases really stand for is the doc-
trine that concealment will not avoid a policy (even though it
contain a statement that the insured has divulged all matters per-
tinent to the risk) where the only unanswered questions are those
that were never asked.0 In numerous decisions use is made of a
"conclusive presumption" that the insurer issued the policy on his
western Nat. Ins. Co. (1898) 12 App. D. C. 245; RoscnstocT v. Missiasippi
Home Ins. Co. (1903) 82 Bliss. 674, 35 So. 309; Parsons, Rich & Co. v. Lane
(1906) 97 Minn. 98, 106 N. W. 485 (leading case); Virginia Fire & Marine
Is. Co. v. Case Threshing Mach. Co. (1907) 107 Va. 588, 59 S. E. 309;
Rochester German Is. Co. v. Schmidt (1908, C. C. A. 4th) 162 Fed. 447;
Lancaster v. Southern Ins. Co. (1910) 153 N. C. 285, 69 S. E. 214; Eagle
Ins. Co. v. Main (1922) 140 Md. 220, 117 At. 571; Del. Guidici v. Importers'
and Exporters' his. Co. (1923) 98 N. J. L. 435, 120 Atl. 5; Virginia Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Lennon, (1924) 140 Va. 766, 125 S. E. 801.
8 Quarrier v. Peabody Is. Co. (1877) 10 W. Va. 507; Dooly v. Hanover
Fire Ins. Co. (1896) 16 Wash. 155, 47 Pac. 507. This discrepancy in the
authorities has been pointed out by a court deciding in favor of the insurer.
Parsons, Rich & Co. v. Lane, supra note 7, at 109, 100 N. W. at 490. And
by a dissenting judge in a contrary case. Glczs Falls Ins. Co. v. Michael
(1907) 167 Ind. 659, 686, 74 N. E. 964, 972. In these opinions numerous
other distinguishable cases customarily cited were examined and their in-
applicability to the instant situation pointed out. The Dooly case, stpra,
has been expressly followed in Burrows v. McCalley (1897) 17 Wash. 269,
49 Pac. 508; Neher v. Western Assur. Co., supra note 2; Grcgerson v. Phenix
Fire Ins. Co. (1918) 99 Wash. 639, 170 Pac. 331; see also Washington Fire
Relief Assoc. v. Albro (1924) 130 Wash. 114, 119, 226 Pac. 264, 206.
9 Cases are numerous in which this doctrine is announced on facts justi-
fying its application. Satterthwvaite v. Mutual Bciz. Ins. Assoc. (1850) 14
Pa. 393; Boggs v. America Izs. Co. (1860) 30 Mo. 63; Rawls v. American
Mutual Life Is. Co. (1863) 27 N. Y. 282; Union Assur. Soc. v. Nalls (1003)
101 Va. 613, 44 S. E. 896; Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. r. Colorado Leasing Co.
(1911) 50 Colo. 424, 116 Pac. 154; Humble v. Gcrman Al!iance, I2m. Co.
(1911) 85 Kan. 140, 116 Pac. 472. Such decisions may have induced the
general change in the practice of insurance companies from reliance on
representations contained in the application to reliance on conditions pre-
cedent prescribed in the policy. See Germczn Mat. Ins. Co. v. iewcedde
(1895) 11 Ind. App. 624, 628, 39 N. E. 534, 535, for another reason for the
insertion of the conditions. Apparently in the first two cases cited supra
note 8 the courts, being accustomed to the old situation, failed to Lee the
difference between it and the new.
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own knowledge of the existent facts.10 Thus, by a fiction, an addi-
tional element unsupported by the evidence is introduced into the
case and an estoppel" is constructed. In other cases the courts
have justified the finding that a so-called waiver exists by saying
that to hold otherwise would be to attribute to the insurer a method
of doing business falling but little short of obtaining money under
false pretenses.
12
So many courts have gone far afield to seek a justification for
making a decision opposite to that which they would unhesitat-
ingly make if the subject matter of the contract were other than
insurance that an economic reason may be suspected. Courts
have often mentioned the peculiar circumstances governing the
formation of the insurance contract 3 and reference to them seems
unnecessary. The contract has been called one of "adhesion",14 as
the insured merely "adheres" to it with little choice as to its terms.
Unfamiliar with the elements which determine the quality of a
risk, the average applicant for insurance customarily and reason-
ably relies on the agent, who he knows is familiar with the busi-
ness, to issue him a policy fully covering the risk against which
he wishes protection. The policy he receives is a complicated,
ready-made mechanism composed of innumerable finely printed
clauses couched in unfamiliar legal language, the meaning and
legal effect of which he would have great difficulty in understand-
ing if he should read them. The common practice is, moreover,
not to read the policy, and a growing number of courts, recogniz-
ing that the custom of the community is one of the circumstances
I
10 Philadelphia Tool Co. v. British Am. Assur. Co. (1890) 132 Pa. 236, 19
AtI. 77; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Bohn (1896) 48 Neb. 743, 67 N. W. 774;
Phenix Ins. Co. v. Fuller (1898) 53 Neb. 811, 74 N. W. 269; Arthur v. Pala-
tine Ins. Co. (1899) 35 Or. 27, 57 Pac. 62; Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co.
v. Mickel (1904) 72 Neb. 122, 100 N. W. 130; Farmers' State Bank v. Tri-
State Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1919) 41 S. D. 398, 170 N. W. 638; Murphey v.
Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., Ltd. (1923) 89 Okla. 207, 214 Pac. 695;
and see Milison v. Mutual Cash Guaranty Fire Ins. Go. (1909) 24 S. D4
285, 288, 123 N. W. 839, 840.
11 The courts frequently use the word "waiver" instead of "estoppel".
For the distinction between these concepts see Vance, op. cit. supra note 5,
passim.
12 WTright v. Fire Ins. Co. (1892) 12 Mont. 474, 31 Pac. 87; German Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Niewedde, supra note 9; Allesina v. London Ins. Co., Ltd. (1904)
45 Or. 441, 78 Pac, 392; Great So. Fire Ins. Co. v. Burns (1915) 118 Ark.
22, 175 S. W. 1161; Johnson v. Rocky Mountain Fire Ins. Co. (1924) 70
Mont. 411, 226 Pac. 515.
13 See Philadelphia Tool Co. v. British Am. Assur. Co., supra note 10, at
241, 19 AtI. at 78; Allesina v. London Ins. Co., Ltd., supra note 12, at 445,
78 Pac. at 393; Great So. Fire Ins. Co. v. Burns, supra note 12, at 28, 175
S. W. at 1162.
14 See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy (1919) 33 HARv.
L. Rnv. 198, 222.
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determining a standard of due care, have held this practice not to
be negligence.'s Accordingly policies have been reformed for
mutual mistake, although the mistake must have become apparent
to the insured if he had examined the contract.6 Similarly, in
suits on the policy, courts have not let failure so to examine pre-
vent recovery, relying on the ground of waiver or estoppel.'
Thus a tendency is marked to relax the strict rules of account-
ability to which a contracting party is ordinarily held.
In the every-day language of the streets, a man "buys" insur-
ance. This terminology, upon examination, does not seem so
metaphorical as at first it may appear. The policy, it has been
isFitchner v. Fidelity Mut. Fire Assoc. (1897) 103 Iowa, 27G, 72 N. W.
530; Medley v. German Alliance Ins. Co. (1904) 55 W. Va. 342, 47 S. E.
101; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Jordan, (1910) 134 Ga. 007, 60 S. E. G11;
Salmon, v. Farm Prop. MUt. Ins. Assoc. (1915) 168 Iowa, 521, 150 N. W.
680; Carlton Lumber Co. v. Lumber Ins. Co. (1910) 81 Or. 390, 158 Pac.
807 (negligence, but not such as to prevent relief); Fidelity & Castalty
Co. v. Palmer (1917) 91 Conn. 410, 99 AtL. 1052; Connzecticut Fire In3. Co.
v. Wigginton (1918) 134 Ark. 152, 203 S. W. 844; Giammares v. Allemania
Fire Ins. Co. (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 460, 105 Atl. 611 (citing cases); Bach v.
People's Nat. Fire Ins. Co. (1922) 97 Conn. 336, 116 Atl. 603; contra: Bost-
wick v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1902) 116 Wis. 392, 89 N. W. 538 (but not if
the insured is an ignorant foreigner: Komula v. Gencral Accident, Fire &
Life Assur. Corp., Ltd. (1917) 165 Wis. 520, 162 N. W. 919); Lunmbcr Under.
writers v. Rife (1915) 237 U. S. 605, 35 Sup. CL. 717; Prudential Ca,. Co. v.
Miller (1919, C. C. A. 6th) 257 Fed. 418; Mctzgcr v. Aetna In-z. Co. (1920)
227 N. Y. 411, 125 N. E. 814.
6 Home Ins. Co. v. Myer (1879) 93 Ill. 271; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v.
Jordan, supra note 15; Agri.ultural Ins. Co. v. Anderson (1919) 120 Miss.
278, 82 So. 146; Sundin v. County Fire Ins. Co. (1919), 144 Minn. 100, 174
N. W. 729; Insurance Co. of N. A. v,. Cleveland (1920) 91 N. J. Eq. 371,
110 Ati. 582; Georgia Cas. Co. v. Lumber Co. (1920) 187 Ky. 511, 219 S. W.
442; Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. Martinsville Harness Co. (1920) 74 Ind. App.
14, 128 N. E. 616; Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Chambers (1922) 24 Ariz.
86, 206 Pac. 1081; Tomato Products Co. v. Manufactrers' Liability Ins. Co.
(1922, 1st Dept.) 203 App. Div. 678, 197 N. Y. Supp. 497; Home Ins. Co. v.
Gaines (1923, Colo.) 218 Pac. 908; Robinson v. Union Auto. Ins. Co. (1021,
Neb.) 198 N. W. 166; Merchants' & Manufacturcrs' Alliance v. Hancn
(1924, Te. Civ. App.) 258 S. W. 257; Brodie t. Atlas Assur. Co. (1925,
La.) 104 So. 620; American Ins. Co. v. Jueschke (1925, Okla.) 237 Pac. 585.
17 Kister -. Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. (1889) 128 Pa. 553, 18 Atl. 447; Mc-
Elroy v. British Am. Ins. Co. (1899, C. C. A. 9th) 94 Fed. 990; Allen .
Phoenix Assur. Co. (1908) 14 Idaho, 728, 95 Pac. 829; Central States Fire
Ins. Co. v. Wright (1925, Tex. Civ. App.) 273 S. W. 029. Most of the case.
do not mention the failure of the insured to read the policy. Miller v.
Prussian Nat. Ins. Co. (1909) 158 Mich. 402, 122 N. W. 1093; Insurance Co.
of Pa. v. Indiana Reduction Co. (1917) 65 Ind. App. 330, 117 N. E. 273;
Stebbins v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. (1921) 115 Wash. 623, 197 Pac. 913;
Midland Motor Co. v. Norwich Union, Fire Ins. Soc. (1925, Mont.) 234 Poe.
482. But the fact must be implied, since an insured who kmows at the time
of issue that the policy is incorrect is uniformly precluded from recovery.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hilton-Green (1916) 241 U. S. 613, 36 Sup. Ct. 076;
Bratley v. Brotherhood (1924, Alinn.) 198 N. W. 128.
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pointed out, is in effect a highly complex machine, as intricate and
as incomprehensible in its details to the layman as an automobile.
He looks upon the two in very much the same way. The one is a
vehicle of physical transportation, the other of financial protection.
Each is a commodity sold him by the agent of the producer. If
his automobile breaks down and fails, in 'onsequence of defective
mechanism, to afford efficient transportation, he can hold the
manufacturer responsible on an implied warranty of fitness, If
his insurance policy breaks down and fails to cover the risk for
which it was secured, why should he not be able to hold the insurer
responsible on a similar warranty? This analogy apparently has
never been expressed by any court, although the opinions of sev-
eral would seem to suggest it.,, At least it seems to rationalize
more plausibly the result which many courts are reaching than
the "false pretenses" and "conclusive presumptions" which they
have expressly mentioned. 20  The implied warranty of reasonable
fitness for an intended purpose has not been confined to the law
of sales. It has been applied to bailments of chattels for hire,"'
to the leasing of furnished dwellings for short terms, 2 and in at
least one state to leases in general. 3  Its extension to insurance
18 Sales Act, sec. 15 (1) ; 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) sees. 227, 235;
Bobriclk Chemical Co. v. Prest-O-Lite Co. (1911) 160 Calif. 209, 116 Pac.
747; Delaware Engineering Co. v. Pusey & Jones Co. (1920, Del.) 112 At].
371; Robinson v. Barteldes Seed Co. (1921) 139 Md. 486, 115 At. 757;
Temple v. Keeler (1924) 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 635; Patterson Foundry
Co. v. Detroit Stove Works (1925, Mich.) 202 N. W. 957; Grace & Co. V.
National Wholesale Grocery Co. (1925, Mass.) 146 N. E. 908; Lorraine Mfg.
Co. v. Allen Mfg. Co. (1925, Colo.) 234 Pac. 1055; Dalton Adding Mach.
Sales Co. v. Denton (1925, Okla.) 234 Pac. 201.
19 See cases cited supra note 12; also Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v.
Chambers, supra note 16, at 94, 206 Pac. at 1084.
2oSupra notes 10, 12.
21 Fowler v. Lock (1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 272. Early American cases seem
to require negligence. Hadley v. Cross (1861) 34 Vt. 586; Horne v. Meakin
(1874) 115 Mass. 326. But more recent cases state the usual sales rule of
implied warranty. Famous Players Film Co. v. Salomon (1918) 79 N. H.
120, 106 Atl. 282; Mallory S. S. Co. v. Druhan (1920) 17 Ala. App. 365, 84
So. 874; Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart (1923) 237 N. Y. 30, 142 N. E.
342. The last case states the rule after a careful consideration of authori.
ties. The court declares that it is unnecessary to consider whether the Sales
Act applies, as suggested in 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 1041.
22 Smith v. Marrable (1843, Exch.) 11 M. & W. 5; Wilson v. Hatton (1877)
L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 336; Ingalls v. Hobbs (1892) 156 Mass. 348, 31 N. E.
286; Young v. Povich (1922) 121 Me. 141, 116 Atl. 26.
23 Louisiana: Bennett v. Southern Scrap Material Co. (1908) 121 La. 204,
46 So. 211; O'Rourke v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills (1913) 133 La. 955, 63
So. 480. The Georgia doctrine goes almost as far. Thompson v. Walker
(1909) 6 Ga. App. 80, 64 S. E. 336; Me Yere v. Withers (1915) 15 Ga. App.
688, 84 S. E. 163; Gibbons v. Hoefeld (1921) 299 Ill. 455, 132 N. E. 425.
The majority doctrine is contra. Valin v. Jewell (1914) 88 Conn. 151, 90
Atl 36; Wood v. Carson (1917) 257 Pa. 522, 101 Atl. 811; Hopkins v. Mur-
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law does not seem strained in view of the results already being
reached by the courts.
STOCK DIvIDENDs VERSuS DIVIDENDS IN STOCK
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchangeable, it is
the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and time in which it is
used"., The truth of this striking statement by Mr. Justice
Holmes is exemplified in the action of the Supreme Court of the
United States in determining the scope of the constitutional power
granted by the Sixteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
enabling Congress "to lay and collect taxes on incomes from what-
ever source derived". The well known decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Eisner v. Macombe 2 (four justices dissent-
ing) that stock dividends are not "income" within the meaning
of the Sixteenth Amendment and so not taxable as such, lays
down what seems at first sight a simple rule, but one which has
given rise to possibly unforeseen complications. Cash dividends
have been admitted by all to be "income" within the meaning of
the amendment. 3 Mr. Justice Holmes, convinced of the truth of
the statement quoted above, came to the conclusion that for the
purpose of the constitutional amendment, though not necessarily
for any other purpose, there was no sound basis for distinguish-
ing stock dividends from cash dividends. 4  Whether or not there
is any valid reason for making the distinction which the majority
of the court did and whether the usual arguments of the courts
phy (1919) 233 Mass. 476, 124 N. E. 252; Kutchcra v. Graft (1921) 191
Iowa, 1200, 184 N. W. 297; Dwyer v. Wooflard (1923, 3d Dept.) 205 App.
Div. 546, 199 N. Y. Supp. 840.
'Towne v. Eisner (1918) 245 U. S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158.
(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189.
'Not only have cash dividends been held to be "income" within the mean-
ing of the Six eenth Amendment, but a stockholder has been held to have
received "income" when a cash dividend was declared and paid to him after
the effective date of the Act of 1913, even though tho dividend came from
assets accumulated by the corporation prior to the effective date of the
Amendment Lynch v. Hornzby (1918) 247 U. S. 339, 38 Sup. Ct. 543. A
distribution by a corporation of its stock holdings in another corporation is
"income" although the stock distributed had been acquired before the Si:-
teenth Amendment. Peabody v. Eisner (1918) 247 U. S. 3,17, 33 Sup. Ct.
546. As to the question of a dividend paid in stock of a corporation other
than the declaring corporation, see infra note 9. It has also been held that
a cash dividend with the preferential right to subscribe to additional share3
is "income". The court said, "Every stockholder could take the money and
use it as he cho~e". Hyde v. Holmes (1908) 198 Mlass. 287, 84 N. E. 318;
Smith -v. Cotting\(1918) 231 Blass. 42, 120 N. E. 177.
4 "I think the word 'incomes' in the Sixteenth Amendment should be read
in a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its
adoption. For it was for public adoption that it was proposed. The lmown
purpose of this amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what might
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are sound are questions which have been so fully and ably dis-
cussed by many writers that additional discussion seems super-
fluousA In any event, it seems at least improbable that that
decision will be overruled; and doubtless the corporations of the
country have adjusted their financial arrangements in accordance
with it, so that a reversal would involve the business community
in serious complications. For these reasons, the present discussion
will accept the result of that case as settled law and will be con-
fined to the complications which necessarily result from drawing
the distinction -between cash and stock dividends.
In approaching this problem, it must not be forgotten that-
if the view of Mr. Justice Holmes in the passage quoted is sound
-in determining the meaning to be given to the word "income"
as used in the Sixteenth Amendment, the particular problem.
viz., taxation under the Sixteenth Amendment, must be kept
steadily in view.6 It is not decisive that the same word may
have had a certain meaning given to it by economists or even
by the courts when deciding another and different problem. For
this reason, for example, cases settling whether or not stock divi-
dends are "income" or an addition to "principal" as between a
life tenant and a remainderman in the law of trusts throw but
little light upon the constitutional question.7
be direct taxes, and I cannot doubt that most people not lawyers would
suppose when they voted for it that they put a question like the present to
rest". Holmes, J., dissenting in Eisner v. Macomber, supra note 2.
5 Clark, Eisner v. Macomber and Some Income Tax Problems (1920) 29
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 735; Seligman, Implications and Effects of the Stool.
Dividend Decision (1921) 21 COL. L. Rzv. 313; Warren, Taxability of Stook
Dividends as Income (1920) 33 HARv. L. Rzv. 885; Powell, Stock Dividends,
Direct Taxes, and the Sixteenth Amendment (1920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 536;
Clark, The Stock Dividend Decision (1920) 23 THE NEW REPUBLIC, 59; Tho
Supreme Court v. The Supreme Court (1920) 21 THE NEW REPUBLIC, 235.
6 That the purpose may vary considerably in different cases is well illus-
trated by the recent case of People ex rel. Clark v. Gilchrist (1925, App.
Div. 3d Dept.) 211 N. Y. Supp. 679. The Income Tax Law of New York
makes stock dividends expressly taxable as "income". It was contended by
the relator that the court was bound by the rule of the Eisner case. The
court, however, held that that case decided only that stock dividends are not
taxable as "income" under the Sixteenth Amendment. The court said:
. . Eisner v. Macomber is not an authority against this state tax as
seems sometimes to have been assumed, but on the contrary is an authority
in favor of the tax. The court expressly stated that the purpose of Congress
to tax stock dividends as "income" is plainly evinced, but such purpose was
thwarted by the constitution. The State Legislature is not hampered by
constitutional restrictions . . . the Legislature may make its own defi-
nition and when it manifests its intention to include stock dividends as in-
come or to bring them within the purview of the Income Tax Law that is the
end of the matter".
It has generally been held that stock dividends are "capital" and as such
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Having determined that under the Sixteenth Amendment stock
dividends are "capital" and that cash dividends are "income" the
court has necessarily been called upon in subsequent cases to
determine where the line is to be drawn, and what type of divi-
dend shall be called a stock dividend. As is so frequently the
case a° distinction which seems at first sight simple turns out to
be extremely complex; and there are cases that do not fall clearly
within either one or the other of these classes, but in a "twilight
zone" intermediate between the two." It has been held that a
distribution by a corporation of its stockholdings in another cor-
poration is "income" and so taxableP This amounts to saying
that a declaration of dividends in the stock of another corporation
and not in the stock of the declaring corporation is "income".
Prof. T. R. Powell has expressed the result well by saying that
dividends to be stock dividends within the rule of the EBizer case
must be dividends in the stock of the declaring corporation, and
that a dividend in the stock of a different corporation is a "divi-
dend in stock" rather than a "stock dividend". This, he says, is
because the dividend in stock transfers to the stockholder what
had previously been assets of the corporation. 10 It would indeed
be extraordinary if it were held that profits distributed as cash
dividends were "income", but profits distributed in the form of
some other kind of property-shares of stock in another corpora-
tion-were not.
go to the remainderman. Gibbons v. Mahon (1890) 136 U. S. 549, 10 Sup.
Ct. 1057; NOTES (1917) 4 VA. L. REv. 660. The Massachusetts Income Tax
Law provides that stock dividends are taxable as "income". It has been
held that this may be done even though stock dividends are treated as
"capital" and as between life tenants and remaindermen go to the latter.
Tax Commissioner v. Putnam (1919) 227 Mass. 522, 116 N. E. 904.
8 See Wurzel, Juridical Thinking (1917) 9 Modern Legal Philoeophy
Series, 342 et seq. "In our approach towards exactness we constantly tend
to work out definite lines or equators to mark distinctions which we first
notice as a difference of poles. It is evident in the beginning that there
must be differences in the legal position of infants and adults. In the end
we establish twenty-one as the dividing point. . . .When he has discovered
that a difference is a difference of degree, that distinguished extremes have
between them a penumbra in which one gradually shades into the other, a
tyro thinks to puzzle you by asking where you are going to draw the line,
and an advocate of more experience will show the arbitrariness of the line
proposed by putting cases very near to it on one side or the other." Holmes,
(1920) Collected Legal Papers 232. See Holmes, J., dissenting in Haddo c:
v. Haddock (1906) 201 U. S. 562, 631, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 553.
9 Peabody v. Eisner (1918) 247 U. S. 347, 38 Sup. Ct. 546. ". . . the
dividend of the Baltimore and Ohio shares was not a stock dividend but a
distribution in specie of a portion of the assets of the Union Pacific, and is
to be governed for all present purposes by the same rule applicable to the
distribution of a like value in money."
10 Powell, Protecting Property and Liberty (1925) 40 PoLrr. Sc. QuAnT.
426.
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If this distinction is made, it becomes necessary to determine
whether the stock distributed is in the same corporation that
declares the dividend or in a different corporation. In the case
of United States v. Phellis,11 decided a year after the Eisner case,
the directors of a New Jersey corporation created another cor-
poration in Delaware and transferred to it property in exchange
for shares of stock which it distributed to the shareholders in
the New Jersey corporation in proportion to their original hold-
ings. A divided court held that the dividends in the new stock
were "income". In the case of Rockefeller v. United States,'"
a similar result was reached on facts which were substantially
the same except that the new corporation was created in the same
state. In both cases the original corporation continued its opera-
tions, and in both cases the old corporation and the new were
practically identical.
A similar problem is raised when the old corporation does not
remain in existence after the formation of the new one. Thus,
in the case of Cullinan v. Walker, 3 a Texas corporation was dis-
solved and the liquidating trustees transferred its assets to two
new corporations in exchange for their stock. This stock they
transferred to a Delaware holding corporation in exchange for its
stock, which was distributed to the shareholders in the old cor-
poration. It was held that the dividend so paid was "income"
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. The reason
given by the court was that the gain taxed "resulted from a
dividend in liquidation actually distributed in the stock of a hold-
ing company incorporated under the laws of a foreign state, not
organized for the purpose of carrying on the old business, and
which held no title to the original assets". On the other hand in
the case of Weiss v. Steam,14 involving substantially similar facts,
except that the new corporation was created in the same state and
took over the assets and business of the old corporation, a con-
trary result was reached. It is difficult to find any sound basis
upon which to distinguish these two cases, and the results seem,
therefore, in conflict.
In the recent case of Marr v. United States (1925, U. S.) 45
Sup. Ct. 575, a divided court followed the rule as laid down in
United States v. Phellis" and in Rockefeller v. United States.10 A
New Jersey corporation had accumulated from profits a large
11 (1921) 257 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 63.
12 (1921) 257 U. S. 176, 42 Sup. Ct. 68. For a brief but able discussion
of these two cases see, Powell, Supreme Court's Review of Legislation,
1921-1922 (1922) 37 POLIT. SC. QUART. 492.
13 (1923) 262 U. S. 134, 43 Sup. Ct. 495.
14 (1924) 265 U. S. 242, 44 Sup. Ct. 490. See Powell, op. cit. supra note 10.
15 Supra note 11.
20 Supra note 12.
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surplus. Its officers caused a new corporation to be organized in
Delaware. The appellants, stockholders in the New Jersey cor-
poration, received in exchange for stock held by them in that
corporation stock in the new corporation. The difference betwveen
the cost of their stock in the New Jersey corporation and the value
of the stock in the Delaware corporation was $324,466.57. The
Treasury Department ruled that this difference was "income", and
assessed an additional income tax. The appellants paid it under
protest and brought suit to recover the amount. It was held that
such a difference was "income" within the meaning of the term as
used in the Sixteenth Amendment. It seems clear that the factual
situation in the instant case is substantially similar to that of the
Phellis and Rockefeller cases, and that a similar rule should be
followed. The result reached by the court seems sound.
It is apparent from an examination of these cases that no rule
of thumb can be laid down as to what is and what is not income
under the Sixteenth Amendment. Whether or not the stock
issued is in substantially the same corporation is one of those
troublesome questions of degree. The more recent decisions per-
haps indicate a tendency on the part of a majority of the Supreme
Court to limit the rule of Eisner v. Macomber that stock divi-
dends are not "income". Possibly this is due to a more or less
unconscious feeling on the part of a majority of the court as it is
now constituted that the decision in Eisner v. Macombcr was an
unfortunate one, and that that ruling should therefore be extended
no further than is absolutely necessary.
OPTION COVENANTS AND THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Although the rule against perpetuities is of relatively recent
growth it was firmly established before the occasion arose to
determine whether it applied to option contracts. In 1879 in
what seems to be the first case involving the question it was held
that a preemption covenant contained in a deed of conveyance of
surface land (that is to say a covenant giving the grantee, his
heirs and assigns, an option to purchase the mineral rights to the
land in case the grantor should ever desire to sell them) was not
obnoxious to the rule., The decision was based on the theory
that the rule was designed merely to prevent suspension of the
power of alienation for longer than the prescribed time and there-
fore would not be infringed, since the covenantor and covenantee
acting together could at any time convey good title to the land.
But in 1882 this case was overruled in Lmzdon anzd South West-
ert Ry. v. Gon2mm, in which it was decided that a covenant in
' Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright (1879) L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 421.
2 (1882) L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 562.
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a deed giving the grantor an unlimited option to repurchase was
void as a perpetuity, since it clogged, even if it did not wholly
prevent, the alienation of the land. This decision has been fol-
lowed uniformly in England4 and generally in this country,' it
being stated by the courts in cases involving a variety of circum-
stances that an option to purchase land which possibly may not
be exercised within the limit prescribed by the rule is void as
creating an undesirable restriction on freedom of alienation.
A well known exception to the rule against perpetuities exist-
ent from the earliest times is found in the case of the lessor's coy-
8 For the two interpretations of the rule see Woodall v. Bruen (1915)
76 W. Va. 193, 195, 85 S. E. 170; Fraser, The Rationale of the Rule
Against Perpetuities (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 560.
4 Trevelyan v. Trevelyan (1885, Ch. Div.) 53 L. T. (N. S.) 853 (essential
facts as in Gomm case, supra note 2); Manchester Ship Canal Co. v.
Manchester Racecourse Co. [1900] 2 Ch. 352, aff'd [1901] 2' Ch. 37 (essen-
tial facts as in Birmingham Canal Co. case, supra note 1); the case of
Southeastern Railway Co. v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers
[1910] 1 Ch. 12, is distinguishable, as the court construed the deed as
reserving a present easement, not an option to create one; see Williams,
Contracts in Restraint of Alienation and the Rule Against Perpotuities
(1910) 54 SOL. JouR. 471, 501.
5Winsor v. Mills (1892) 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352 (agreement pro-
viding for certain land to be held for the joint benefit of two several
owners until both should agree to discontinue arrangement and giving one
a power to purchase a specified portion for a specified price any time
during duration of the arrangement) ; Starcher Bros. v. Jeff Duty (1907)
61 W. Va. 373, 56 S. E. 524 (one year purchase-option contract renewable
yearly forever); Barton v. Thaw (1914) 246 Pa. 348, 92 At. 312 (deed
of mineral rights containing a surface purchase-option covenant); Woodall
v. Bruen, supra note 3 (two deeds of land with covenants to reconvey
mineral rights at grantor's option, one unlimited in time, the other within
ninety-nine years); Henderson v. Bell (1918) 103 Kan. 422, 173 Pac. 1124
(covenant in deed giving grantor the power of preemption); Lewis Oyster
Co. v. West (1919) 93 Conn. 518, 107 AtI. 138, discussed in COMMENTS
(1919) 29 YArm LAw JOURNAL, 87 (same facts); Eastman Marble Co. v.
Vermont Marble Co. (1920) 236 Mass. 138, 128 N. E. 177 (contract settling
boundary, containing twenty-five year purchase-option covenant); Turner
v. Peacock (1922) 153 Ga. 870, 113 S. E. 585 (deed with covenant giving
grantee an option to purchase certain additional land); Skeen v. Clinch-
field Coal Corp. (1923) 137 Va. 397, 119 S. E. 89 (same); contra: Buck
v. Walker (1911) 115 Minn. 239, 132 N. W. 205 (upholding covenant in
a deed of land excepting minerals, which gave grantee an unlimited option
to pay damages or repurchase the land); Mineral Land Inv. Co. v. Bishop
Iron Co. (1916) 134 Minn. 412, 159 N. W. 966 (upholding a fifty-year
option for a lease); cf. Ball u. Milliken (1910) 31 R. I. 36, 76 Atl. 789
(not mentioning the rule against perpetuities, but upholding a covenant
in a deed binding the grantee to convey to the grantor on breach of con-
dition); . R. R., The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Options,
NOTE AND COMMENT (1916) 14 MIcH. L. REv. 231; J. R. Rood, Options
and the Rule Against Perpetuities (1917) 23 CASE AND COMMENT, 835;
(1917) 15 Mion. L. REV. 526.
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enant to renew a lease at the lessee's option.6 This, it appears, has
always been held valid even though granting a power to require
a perpetual series of renewals,7 and even though the first occa-
sion for exercise of this power will be after the prescribed period
has run." Although an attempt has been made to rationalize the
exception by means of the fiction that the power to renew is part
of the lessee's present interest and that he takes substantially a
fee,9 it cannot thus be explained away. Its existence, however,
can be accounted for by reference to the origin of the rule against
perpetuities. It is a judge-made rule, a rule of policy necessi-
tated by the increased freedom in the creation of contingent
future estates brought about by the operation of the Statute of
Uses. It was aimed to curb the power of the great English
landed proprietors by disabling them from placing obstacles in the
way of the alienation of their estates out of their respective fami-
lies for a period longer than was deemed politic. In the era in
which the rule was taking shape leaseholders were scarcely a
class of persons likely to impair the best interests of society by
acquiring too much land. Accordingly it seems never to have
been brought to the attention of the courts that, logically, the
customary covenants for the renewal of leases would fall under
the letter of the ban which was being established.
Two other exceptions merit mention. A so-called "right of
forfeiture and re-entry" (really a power) reserved to a grantor
or lessor in a deed of conveyance or of lease for however long a
term has been held valid by American courts, 0 in many cases
6 Apparently the earliest decision to this effect is Bridgea v. Hitchcocl
(1715) 1 Bro. P. C. 522.
7 Bridges v. Hitchcock, supra note 6; Furnival v. Crcw (1714) 3 At-.
83; Copper Mining Co. v. Beach (1823, Ch.) 13 Beav. 478; Sadlier -e.
Biggs (1853) 4 H. L. 435; Blackmore v. Boardman (1859) 28 lMIo. 420;
Banks v. Haskie (1876) 45 Md. 207; Hoff v. Royal Metal Furniture Co.
(1907, 2d Dept.) 117 App. Div. 884, 103 N. Y. Supp. 371, aff'd (1907) 189
N. Y. 555, 82 N. E. 1128; Wynn v. Conway Corp. [1914] 2 Ch. 705; Thaw v.
Gaffney (1914) 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S. E. 983; Becker v. Submarine Oil
Co. (1921) 55 Calif. App. 698, 204 Pac. 245 (not mentioning the contrary
decision of Morrison v. Rossignol (1855) 5 Calif. 65).
8 Banks v. Haskic, supra note 7; Toms v. Williams (1879) 41 Mich.
552, 2 N. W. 814.
9 See Gray, Rule Against Perpetuitics (3d ed. 1915) sec. 230. He says
that the rule against perpetuities, practical though strict. treats the situa-
tion according to effect and not form. Although this text is retained
from the first edition, it is admitted (sec. 230 a) that Williams in Optiz', 3
to Purchase in Leases and the Rule Against Pcrpotuitics (1898) 42 SoL.
Jour. 628, has pointed out that the construction seems strained in thoze
cases where the power of renewal must be exercised at a set time or on
payment of a fine.
10 French v. Old South Society (1871) 106 Mass. 479; Wahefield V. Van
TasseU (1903) 202 Ill. 41, 66 N. E. 830.
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without mention of the rule against perpetuities. 11  In England
it has been held void under the rule.12 In neither country is a
possibility of reverter after a fee on special limitation obnoxious
thereto. 1" The validity of these two interests, like that of re-
newal options in leases, can be accounted for by the fact that they
were well established long before the rule against perpetuities
was born. It may also be noted that they are not sufficiently
numerous to be harmful to the public.
Although a lease for a term longer than the perpetuity period
frequently contains a covenant giving the lessee an option to pur-
chase the fee at any time during the term, up to the beginning of
the twentieth century the question of the validity of such a cove-
nant apparently had never been before the courts.14  In at least
two cases in the United States such covenants had been enforced
without mention of perpetuities. 15 Text writers had discussed
the problem and arrived at divergent conclusions. 0 The situa-
tion seems to bear strong resemblances to three of those previ-
ously discussed. It is difficult to perceive any substantial dif-
ference between a purchase-option covenant contained in a deed
of lease and a similar covenant in other deeds of conveyance,
since in both cases the option holder has the power to create in
himself after the prescribed period has run the same set of legal
-Lessee of Sperry v. Pond (1832) 5 Ohio, 387; Pickle v. McKissioch
(1853) 21 Pa. 232; Scott v. Stipe (1859) 12 Ind. 74; Taylor v. Cedar
Rapids Ry. (1868) 25 Iowa, 371; Homer v. Chicago Ry. (1875) 38
Wis. 165; Cowell v. Springs Co. (1879) 100 U. S. 55; Langley v. Chapin
(1883) 134 Mass. 82; Smith v. Barrie (1885) 56 Mich. 314, 22 N. W.
816; Upington v. Corrigan (1896) 151 N. Y. 143, 45 N. E. 359; Oxford
Bd. of Trade v. Oxford Iron & Steel Co. (1911) 81 N. J. L. 694, 80 AtI.
324; Southwick v. New York Christian Missionary Soc. (1912, 4th Dept.)
151 App. Div. 116, 135 N. Y. Supp. 392, aff'd (1914) 211 N. Y. 515, 105
N. E. 204; Rook's Creek Church v. Church of Pontiac (1919) 290 Ill. 133,
124 N. E. 793.
"12Dunn v. Flood (1883) L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 629; In re Hollis Hospital
[1899] 2 Ch. 540; In re Da Costa [1912] 1 Ch. 337.
3vNorth v. Graham (1908) 235 I1. 178, 85 N. E. 267; Pond v. Douglass
(1909) 106 Me. 85, 75 AtI. 320; Board of Freeholders v. Buck (1912) 79
N. J. Eq. 472, 82 Atl. 418; Pennsylvania Horticultural Soc. v. Craig (1913)
240 Pa. 137, 87 Atl. 678 (discussing the rule against perpetuities); Fall
Creek Tp. v. Shuma (1913) 55 Ind. App. 232, 103 N. E. 677; Loomis v.
Heublein (1916) 91 Conn. 146, 99 Atl. 483; Des Moines Ry. v. Des Moines
(1916, Iowa) 159 N. W. 450; Puffer v. Clark (1918) 202 Mich. 169, 168
N. W. 471; see Yarbrough v. Yarbrough (1925, Tenn.) 269 S. W. 36, 38;
and dicta expounded in Gray, op. cit. supra note 9, secs. 33, 40.
14 Mr. Williams, op. cit. supra note 9, stated that the question had never
been decided.
'15 Prout v. Ruby (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 471; Hagar v. Buck (1872) 44
Vt. 285.
16 A number of such discussions are mentioned by Williams, op. cit. supra
note 9.
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relations with respect to the land. Likewise there seems to be
no real difference between a purchase-option covenant and a re-
newal-option covenant in a deed of lease, since in both cases the
option holder's power is to create in himself a right to perpetual
possession of the land (plus numerous subsidiary legal relations)
with the distinction, which seems more apparent than actual, that
in the case of the lease the power is exercised periodically to
create rights to possession for successive terms. Moreover, a
power of entry for condition broken seems, on analysis, very sim-
ilar to a lessee's option to purchase, for each is a power in one of
the two parties who together have the complete group of legal
relations constituting property in land to vest in himself the
totality of those relations.
In 1905 the leading case of Woodal v. Cliftonl7 established for
England the doctrine that the purchase-option covenant in a lease
is no exception to the rule against perpetuities but comes within
the doctrine of the Gomm case.18 The court was of the opinionlo
that the exception of the renewal-option covenant was difficult to
justify logically and should not be extended; moreover, that the
classic justification for that exception, the fiction that the added
term is part of the original estate of the lessee, could not be ap-
plied to the new situation. This holding is law today in Eng-
land.20 In Ireland a series of analogous cases have decided that
a clause in an instrument in which a legal rent charge is created
providing that the charge may be determined at any time by pay-
ing a fixed sum of money is in violation of the rule against per-
petuities, 21 while a clause in a similar instrument providing that
the rent may be fined down to a peppercorn is valid.22 In Amer-
-7 [1905] 2 Ch. 257.
Is Supra note 2.
19 Opinion of the trial judge, Warrington, J., printed in Woodall v.
Clifton, supra note 17, at 259. The decree was afired by the Court of
Appeal in Woodall v. Clifton, at 278.
20 Worthing Corp. v. Heather [1906] 2 Ch. 532 (specific performance
of a purchase-option covenant was denied in a suit by the lessee of a
thirty-year lease, but damages were awarded on the theory that inasmuch
as at common law no interest in land is created by the covenant the rule
against perpetuities does not apply. But cf. Eastman Marble Co. V. Vermont
Marble Co., supra, note 5, at 153, 128 N. E. at 183, holding in a case in-
volving a purchase-option covenant contained in a deed that damage3 were
not allowable as being equally with specific performance outside the policy
of the law); Rider v. Ford [1923] 1 Ch. 541 (carefully distinguishing
between purchase- and renewal-option covenants, but not discussing the
reason for this distinction).
21 In re TyrrellUs Estate [1907] 1 Ir. R. 292, overruling Switzer v. Roch-
ford [1906] 1 Ir. R. 399; In re Donwughmorc [1911] 1 Ir. R. 211.
22Inz re Browne [1911] 1 Ir. R. 205. This distinction is used by Rood,
Options and the Rule Against Perpotuitics, supra note 5, as a glaring
example of the absurd results achieved by applying the rule against per-.
petuities to option contracts.
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ica until recently there was apparently but a single case deter-
mining the validity of purchase-option covenants in long-term
leases: Hollander v. Central Metal and Supply Co.23  This case,
which considers the English authorities and repudiates them, has
been considered by some text writers24 as expressing a purely
local rule founded upon the Maryland practice of holding land by
long-term leases; and such a conclusion indeed is to be inferred
from the language of the court.25 But the recent case of Keogh
v. Peck (1925) 316 Ill. 318, 147 N. E. 266, seems to indicate
that the Maryland rule is perhaps wider in its application.
In this case the rule against perpetuities was one of the defenses
pleaded to a bill for specific performance of a purchase-option
covenant in a ninety-nine year lease. The court examined a few
authorities 2 cited in favor of this plea and distinguished them
on the grounds, first, that in none of them was the option cov-
enant contained in a lease, and, secondly, that they all were based
on the conception that an option to purchase created an interest
in land, whereas "in this state no title, legal or equitable, is
granted and no interest in land is created in the holder of the
option by the option agreement." V The court then compared
the covenant in question first with renewal-option covenants and
secondly with conditions in deeds of conveyance or of lease giv-
ing the grantor or lessor for their breach an option of forfeiture
and re-entry, and was unable to find any distinction between
them and the covenant in issue. It then referred to the Holl-
ander case 28 mentioned above and decided that the instant cov-
enant was valid under the rule against perpetuities.
The court in distinguishing authorities apparently overlooked
the indistinguishable doctrine of Woodall v. Clifton20 though it
subsequently quoted from the case arguendo. Moreover, even
though it be admitted that the rule against perpetuities is in-
applicable to purely contractual rights,8° the statement that in
23 (1909) 109 Md. 131, 71 Atl. 442.
24 Gray, op. cit. supra note 9, at 205, note 2; (1924) 22 MicH. L. RV.
279; (1924) 10 VA. L. REv. 333; other writers have given the decision
more credit: J. R. R., op. cit. supra note 5, at 231; Rood, op. cit. supra,
note 5, at 836; Abbot, Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities (1918) 27
YAm LAW JOURNAL, 878, 888.
25109 lMd. at 159, 71 AtI. at 447, quoting Banks v. Haskie, supra noto
7, at 218.
20London & South Western Ry. v. Gomm, supra note 2; Winsor v,
Mills, supra note 5; Starcher v. Duty, supra note 5; Lewis Oyster Co.
v. West, supra. note 5.
27At 271. *
2 8 Supra note 23.
2 9 Supra note 17.
30 This doctrine has been frequently stated by courts and text writers:
Worthing Corp. v. Heather, supra note 20, at 542; Gray, op. cit. supra
note 9, sec. 329; but see NoTES (1925) 25 CoL. L. REY. 77.
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Illinois no interest in land is created by a purchase-option cov-
enant seems hardly justified by the authority cited by the
courtA1 The decision, therefore, does not seem sustainable on
either of the first two grounds advanced. It may, however, be
recognized as the first extension of the Maryland rule,-which
may indeed become the American rule, for there are at present
at least two3 2 American jurisdictions for it and apparently none
against it.
The rule against perpetuities being merely a rule of policy
there seems to be no reason why new exceptions to its operation
should not be developed by the courts as policy dictates. The
peril of dominance by an oligarchy composed of a small landed
aristocracy does not exist in America. Here the only justifica-
tion for the rule seems to be the maxim that land should be
freely alienable in order that it may come into the hands of the
man most likely to improve it for his own benefit and for the
general good of society. In this country long-term leases have
proved a profitable method of land tenure, advantageous alike
to lessor and lessee, under which at least one large city, Balti-
more, has grown to prosperity. 3  The reversion, valuable be-
cause of the rent annexed to it, sells as a sound and stable in-
vestment of unfluctuating value; the term is likewise assignable.
The termor, protected by the purchase-option covenant, is safe
in making any development of the property which economic need
may require, 4 and any purchaser of the term may, by exercising
3' Gall v. Stoll (1913) 259 Ill. 174, 102 N. E. 225. The decision is
merely that no title, legal or equitable, is vested in the purchaser of land
by virtue of a "bond for a deed" (a contract to convey to the purchaser
upon his making certain specified payments). Not until those payments
are made, says the court, does the right to specific performance accrue
and the equitable title vest. That is not at all the same thing as saying
that a covenant giving an option to purchase creates no interest in land.
By the Hohfeld system of analysis an option is a power-liability relation.
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conccptions (1913) 23 YA LAW JOUR;AL,
16.) The option holder has a power to create in himself a right in
the land. The landowner has a liability to have created in him a duty to
convey the land. The power of the option holder is surely an interest in
land, as many courts have declared; e. g., see Manchestcr Ship Canal
Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co., supra note 4, at 366. For a collection
of judicial definitions of an interest in property see 2 Words and Phrases
(2d Series, 1914) 1137. That an express power to create an estate in
land, known customarily as a power of appointment, is within the rule of
perpetuities is everywhere acknowledged. Gray, op. cit. supra note 9, at
379.
32 Maryland and Illinois; this does not include the United States Su-
preme Court and Vermont which have decided the same way without con-
sideration of the rule against perpetuities. See supra note 15.
33 Banks v. Haslke, supra, note 7.
34 Cf. Abbot, op. cit. supra note 24, at 886.
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the option, acquire the whole fee at will. It thus seems that
though upon analysis a purchase-option covenant contained in a
deed of lease creates the same legal relations as one contained
in other deeds of conveyance, its economic effect is beneficial
rather than injurious. Our law is not a merely logical system;
consciously or unconsciously, courts frequently base decisions on
grounds of economic betterment. The growth of the rule against
perpetuities is an instance of this. Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa
lex. A new exception to the rule against perpetuities may well
be born.
RIGHTS OF A DEPENDENT BENEFICIARY UNDER INSURANCE
POLICIES PROCURED WITH MISAPPROPRIATED FUNDS
The embezzler or defaulter who uses part of his ill-gotten gains
to purchase insurance for innocent dependents precipitates a
struggle for the proceeds of the policies so obtained. The claim of
his widow or other beneficiary is usually met with an attempt on
the part of the defrauded person to follow his money into the poli-
cies procured therewith and secure the proceeds of such policies.
A recent case, Truelsch v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Co. (1925, Wis.) 202 N. W. 352 (one judge dissenting) may
be added to the list of authorities favoring this contention of the
defrauded party.' The insured had embezzled $4,477.73 from his
employers. With part of the stolen funds he paid all the prem-
iums on three policies of life insurance, and the last two of three
premiums on a fourth policy; the whole amount of insurance
aggregating $5,500. In an action to impress a trust upon the
policies, it was held that while the widow was entitled to one-
third of the fourth policy, proportionate to the honest premium
paid therefor, the plaintiff was equitably entitled to the balance
of the proceeds up to the amount of the embezzlement, which was
all that was claimed in the bill.
The cases which deny the beneficiary's claim to the proceeds of
such policies are professedly based upon that rule of the law of
trusts permitting the following of trust funds into their product.2
IShaler v. Trowbridge (1877) 28 N. J. Eq. 595; Holmes v. Gilman (1893)
138 N. Y. 369, 34 N. E. 205; Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co. v.
Josselyn (1923) 224 Mich. 159, 194 N. W. 548; Vorlander v. Keyes (1924,
C. C. A. 8th); I Fed. (2d) 67;? cf. Bromley v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry.
(1899) 103 Wis. 562, 567, 79 N. W. 741, 743; contra: Bennett v. Rosbor.
ough (1923) 155 Ga. 265, 116 S. E. 788, criticised in (1923) 26 A. L. R.
1408, note; (1923) 33 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 207.
2 Shaler v. Trowbridge, supra, note 1, at 602; Holmes v. Gilman, supra
note 1, at 376, 34 N. E. at 206; Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co. v.
Josselyn, supra note 1, at 162, 194 N. W. at 549; Vorlander v. Keyes, supra
note 1, at 69; Truelseh v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insuranco Go. cited in
text p. 220, at 357.
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The defrauded person is thus given the adventitious advantage
which results from the greatly increased value of the policy, con-
sequent upon the death of the insured. The recovery of this in-
crease in value is not based on any meritorious act of the de-
frauded person, but on the idea that the trustee must not be
permitted to gain by his wrongdoing in improperly, investing
another's funds.3 The constructive trust is in no way dependent
upon the agreement or the intention of the parties; it is a device
to attain the ends of justice4 No compulsion should attach to
its use in a case where countervailing considerations are involved
in such manner as to cause its application to work injustice.5 It
has been expressly stated that life insurance does not differ from
other forms of investment in this type of case.0 But in maldng
such a statement the courts seem not to have given adequate con-
sideration to the functional aspect of life insurance. It is sub-
mitted that to emphasize this factor and to permit the defrauded
person to recover only the amount of the premiums stolen, plus
interest, is to reach a sounder result. Only life insurance for the
benefit of dependents, however, is within the scope of this dis-
cussion.
Practically all the cases heretofore decided have declared that
the entire amount of the insurance money is subject to a trust,
3 "This excess above full compensation is not given to the cestui que trust
by reason of any merit on his part. It comes to him as a mere windfall.
Public policy demands that the faithless trustee should not retain any ad-
vantage derived from his breach of trust. Hence the wholesome rule
that whatever a trustee loses in the misuse of the trust fund he loses for
himself, and whatever he wins he wins for the beneficiary." Ames, Lcc-
tures on Legal History (1913) 413.
4 1 Perry, Trust and Trustees (6th ed. 1911) sec. 166; 3 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprdence (4th ed. 1918) 2405. This has been recognized in the cas
under consideration. Of. Shaler v. Trowbridge, upra note 1, at 602.
For example: There is no equity in the cestui quo trust's claim to the
accession in value to the trust res (see supra note 3). His equity extends
only to the value of the trust res, plus interest. When the trust 7c. is
given to an innocent donee whose astuteness in investing it increases
its value, it would seem that the cestui's claim to the accession in value
should be regarded as inferior to that of the innocent donee. See Ames,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 417.
6 The courts are almost unanimous in making this statement. See Masa-
chusetts Bonding and Insurance Co. v. Josselyn, cupra note 1, at 160, 194
N. W. at 549. Mr. Williston, writing on a somewhat similar question, was of
the same opinion. Williston, Can an Insolvent Debtor Insure Id- Life for the
Benefit of his Wife? (1891) 25 Am. L. REV. 185, 193. "If this suit had
been presented in the life time of the husband, and the policy had been dis-
posed of to the company for its surrender value, it would hardly have been
insisted that he could claim, in a court of conscience, a right to any exceas
of the proceeds after refunding to his firm the amount of the premiums."
Van Syckel, J., in Shaler v. Trowbridge, supra note 1, at 604. It is to be
observed, however, that cases like the instant one, where the husband is
dead, are different from the case put by the court just quoted. On the
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where all the -premiums have been paid with misappropriated
funds. There are some dicta, however, to the effect that the per-
son whose money has been used to pay the insurance premiums
can recover only the amount so used plus interest.7 Where only a
part of the premiums has been paid with misappropriated funds,
a trust has been impressed on a proportional part of the policy
proceeds.8 It has also been declared that when the first premium
is paid with the insured's own money, and stolen money is used
to pay subsequent premiums, the beneficiary is entitled to every-
thing except the sums misapplied plus interest9 Misappro-
priated money in such a case is being used for the maintenance
rather than the purchase of the chose in action.10 This distinc-
tion, however, was not taken in the instant case.11
While it has been said that "the cestui que trust takes the
whole of the insurance money, although ten times as much as
the trust money misappropriated" 12 it is to be noted that in
most of the cases decided the proceeds of the policies have in
fact been less than the total sum taken. The circumstance that
the insurance money exceeded the entire amount misappropriated,
as in the instant case, was present only once before.13 It is sig-
death of her husband, the power to procure life insurance for the wife's
benefit is destroyed; while she might still have exercised it during the life
time of the husband on the discovery of his defalcations.
7 Hubbard v. Stapp (1889) 32 Ill. App. 540, 546; Thum .v. Wolston-
holme (1900) 21 Utah, 446, 469, 61 Pac. 537, 542; Bank of Stewart
County v. Mardre (1914) 142 Ga. 110, 111, 82 S. E. 519.
8 Dayton v. Claflin Co. (1897, 1st Dept.) 19 App. Div. 120, 45 N. Y. Supp.
1005; Vorlander v. Keyes, supra note 1; Massachusetts Bonding and Insur-
ance Co. v. Josselyn, supra note 1.
9 See Holmes v. Davenport (1891, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 18 N. Y. Supp. 56,
63; Thum v. Wolstenholme, supra note 7, at 469, 61 Pac. at 540.
1OBy the prevailing view the contract of life insurance is regarded as an
entire contract, and not a contract for a year with privilege of renewal.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham (1876) 93 U. S. 24. Analogous7 cases
supporting the proposition in the text may be found in the law of trusts.
Hanna v. McLaughlin (1902) 158 Ind. 292, 63 N. E. 475 (tracing trust
funds into payment of mortgage of trustee; held, cestui entitled to lien
upon property to the extent that his money had gone into it); Bodwell v.
Nutter (1886) 63 N. H. 446, 3 AtI. 421 (trust money expended not in pur-
chase of land, but in improvements upon it; held, no trust results to the
owner of the money).
11 In Vorlander v. Keyes, supra note 1, where half of the initial premium
was paid with stolen funds, prorating was consistent with the position taken'
by the court.
22 Ames, loc. cit. supra note 3.
13 In Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Go. v. Josselyn, supra note 1,
the trustee owed $31,147.91 as a result of his misuse of trust funds; the total
proceeds of the policies amounted to $62,180.53. After prorating the pro-
ceeds of the policies on which but part of the premiums had been paid
with trust money, it was concluded that $54,471.80 belonged to the cestui
que trust. but the decree limited recovery to the amount of the actual
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nificant that in these two cases the defrauded person was given,
not the whole proceeds of the policies, but only so much as was
necessary to make good the sum embezzled.14 Cases not involv-
ing insurance, in which trust property is followed into its pro-
duct, do not show this unwillingness to permit the cestui qze trust
to recover the entire fruits of the improper investment." The
exceptional treatment of the life insurance contract in the instant
case and in the Michigan case would perhaps indicate a tacit
recognition of the fact that life insurance contracts for the benefit
of dependents are to be regarded as different from other choses
in action, in spite of the courts' declarations to the contrary.
But these decisions are open to more serious objection. It is
well recognized that the cestui que trust must stand or fall on his
ability to trace a particular res into a definite product?0 If re-
covery is limited to the amount misappropriated, then the courts
are no longer tracing the trust res (the amount of the premiums)
into its final product and giving thaot product to the cestui. It
shortage-$31,147.91. In Vorlander v. Keyes, stpra note 1, the exact
amount of the trustee's indebtedness to the defrauded person does not ap-
pear; he is described as being "heavily indebted".
'4 "The decree limited recovery to the amount of the actual shortage as
determined by the probate court. This, we think, plaintiff was clearly en-
titled to. The conclusion reached is in accord with that e.xprezsed in
Holrmes v. Gilman. . ." Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co. -,.
Josselyn, supra note 1, at 164, 194 N. W. at 549. But the extent of recovery
when the insurance money exceeded the amount misappropriated was ex-
pressly left undetermined in the case on which the court relies. See Holbca v.
Gilman, supra, note 1, at 385, 34 N. E. at 209--'If the proceeds of these
policies had been greater than the whole amount of the indebtedneZs of the
husband to the cestui que trust, arising out of the husband's breach of
trust, we do not decide what might in equity be the different rights of the
wife and such cestui qze trust in the balance, or whether any different rule
could be logically applied." The instant case recognizes this, but seems to
have overlooked the MIichigan ease. See Trnulsch v. Northicstcro. Mutual
Life Insurance Co. cited in tex:t p. 220, at 360.
15 Weaver v. Fisher (1884) 110 Ill. 146; Bent v. Pricot (1885) 86 Mo.
475.
16 This has been recognized in the cases under consideration. See Holxzc
v. Gilman, supra note 1, at 376, 34 N. E. at 20G; Masachusett.s Bonding and
Insurance Co. v. Jos~elyn, supra note 1, at 162, 194 N. W. at 549. In come
states the rule has been relaxed so as to allow the estate of the trustee
to be charged with the trust where it can be shown to have been benefited
by its use. Hopkins v. Burr (1898) 24 Colo. 502, 52 Pac. G70; Rccc3 v.
Pierce (1902) 64 Kan. 502, 67 Pac. 1108. But the general rule is that the
trust "res can be followed only when the ccstuai is able to trace and identify
it in particular property. Slater v. Oriental Mills (1893) 18 R. I. 352, 27
AtI. 443; Spokane County v. Firstl National Bank (1895, C. C. A. 9th) 63
Fed. 979; Matter of Hicks (1902) 170 N. Y. 195, 63 N. E. 276; Hczitt v.
Hayes (1910) 205 Mlass. 356, 91 N. E. 332. The cases are discussed at
length by Pound, C. in City of Lincoln -. Morrison (1902) 64 Neb. 822,
90 N. W. 905.
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may seriously be questioned, then, whether the courts have not
abandoned the path of the constructive trust, on which they pro-
fess to be proceeding.
Life insurance has its origin in the desire to protect the family."
While as late as 1815 a Massachusetts court was seriously con-
sidering whether the contract of life insurance was consonant
with sound policy,' 8 life insurance for the benefit of dependents
has continued to play an increasingly important r~le in modern
social engineering. 9 Not only has modern law recognized the
legality of such provision against misfortune, but it has accorded
very special protection to the beneficiaries of such insurance.
Some form of exemption of insurance money in the hands of de-
pendents from the claims of the insured's creditors is to be found
in the statutes of practically every state in the Union. -0  Both
17 "But if the term 'insurance' be given a broader significance and be
made to include any kind of conventional arrangement by which one or
more persons assume the risk of perils to which others are exposed-that is,
an arrangement for aiding the unfortunate--then it is equally unquestion-
able that insurance is as old as human society itself." Vance, Early His.
tory of Insurance Law (1908) 8 CoL. L. REv. 1, 3. "The purpose of the
insured, made possible by the insurer, is to extend his earning power be-
yond the term of his life for the express advantage of those who in his
life were the beneficiaries of that earning power. The life insurance con-
tract is sentiment transmuted with actuarial accuracy into the genuine
substance which sustains widows and orphans in the months and years fol.
lowing the decease of the breadwinner." Blackburn, The Life Insurance
Contract, Being Unique, Should Be So Considered and Treated by Courts
and Law Makers (1916) (paper read before the Association of Life Insur-
ance Counsel). See also 14 Enc. Brit. (11th ed. 1910) 656 et seq.
s Lord v. DalI (1815) 12 Mass. 115. And the ban of illegality on the
life insurance contract was not lifted in France until 1820. See Vance,
Beneficiary in Life Insurance (1922) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 343, 346, note
19. The objection to life insurance was thus stated: " . . . that it
is indecorous to set a price upon the life of a man, and especially a freeman,
which, as they say, is above all price." Parker, C. J. in Lord v. Dali, supra,
characteristically questioned the soundness of such an argument in the
absence, at that time, of freedom in France.
19 The Significance of the Recent Growth. in Life Insurance (1923) PRo-
CEEDINGS OF THE 17TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AssociATioN OF LiFE IN-
SURANCE PRESIDENTS, 102 et seq.
20 Legislation was passed at comparatively early dates permitting a mar-
ried woman to insure the life of her husband for her sole use to be free
from his creditors. N. Y. Laws, 1840, ch. 80; Mass. Laws, 1844, ch, 82.
Practically all of the modern statutes grant exemptions of life insurance
for the benefit of wives and children. While the statutes vary in the degree
of protection accorded, they may be grouped as follows: (1) those not
limiting the amount of insurance exempted; (2) those limiting the amount
exempted to a stated sum; (3) those limiting the amount exempted by the
amounts of the premiums. For a complete list and analysis of the statu-
tory exemptions in all the states see Young, Bankruptcy and Exemption
Statutes as Affecting Disposition of Life Insurance Proceeds (1918)
(paper read before the Association of Life Insurance Counsel). For a study
224
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by judicial decision and by statute in many jurisdictions the priv-
ilege of an insolvent debtor to procure insurance to a reasonable
amount for the protection of dependents is recognized.2 1 It is to
be noted that the case of Cohen v. Samuels,-2 holding that the trus-
tee in bankruptcy may exercise the power reserved by the insured
bankrupt to change the beneficiary and thus obtain the cash sur-
render value of the policy, did not involve an exemption statute.
But where there are exemption statutes, the weight of authority
under the Bankruptcy Act still favors the insured's wife's rights,
though the power is reserved to change the beneficiary.? And
of the extent to -which statutes may control the disposition of life insur-
ance proceeds, see Young, Rights of Beneficiarics, Next of Kin, Creditors,
and Others to Life Insurance Policies, and the Proceeds Thcrcof Under the
Statutes of Maine (1917) (paper read before the Association of
Life Insurance Counsel). In the cases under consideration (and in the
instant case) it is sometimes sought to defeat the defrauded person's claim
to the proceeds of the policies by invoking one of the statutes herein men-
tioned. With the exception of Bennett v. Rosborough, supra note 1, such
attempts have been unsuccessful. The soundness of that decision, resting
as it does on Ga. Civ. Code, 1910, sec. 2498, may be questioned. (1923) 33
YALE LAW JouRNAL, 207; (1923) 26 A. L. R. 1403, note. The weakness
of the Georgia statute has been the subject of judicial comment ". . . the
law of Georgia is not as explicit as the law of some of the states for the pro-
tection of the widow." Speer, J., in 12t re Cohn, (1916, S. D. Ga.) 230 Fed.
733, 737. And the Supreme Court of the United States in construing that
statute held that it did not protect the cash surrender value of the policy
from the trustee in bankruptcy. Cohn v. Malone (1919) 248 U. S. 450,
39 Sup. Ct. 141; (1919) 28 YALE LAW JoThrAL, 603.
21 The leading case recognizing this privilege in the absence of statute
is Central National Bank v. Hume (1888) 128 U. S. 195, 9 Sup. Ct. 41;
Pence v. Makepeace (1879) 65 Ind. 345, 360; contra: Lehman v. Gunn
(1899) 124 Ala. 213, 27 So. 475; Williston, op. cit. supra note 6. In some
jurisdictions the creditor may recover premiums paid subsequent to in-
solvency. Houston v. Maddux. (1899) 179 Ill. 377, 53 N. E. 599. This re-
sult is sometimes reached by statute. Blinn. Gen. Sts. 1913, see. 3465;
Hurd's Ill. Rev. Sts. 1919, ch. 73, see. 199; Ohio Rev. Gen. Code, 1921, see.
9394. Where the statute is silent as to the disposition of the insurance
money in excess of the statutory exemption, the creditors, by the prevail-
ing view, can only recover the premiums paid in excess of the statutory
exemption. Bank v. Huiet (1916, E. D. S. C.) 244 Fed. 216. But in Com-
well v. Surety Fund Life Co. (1921) 44 S. D. 391, 184 N. W. 211,
defendants did not ask for limitation of recovery to amount of premiums
paid for insurance in excess of amount exempted. See also Richards,
Insurance Law (3d ed. 1916) 91.
22 (1917) 245 U. S. 50, 38 Sup Ct. 36; (1918) 27 Yu ILWw JotnAL,
403, 404.
23 Young v. Thomason (1912) 179 Ala. 454, 60 So. 272; Jeu, v. Davis
(1922, C. C. A. 8th) 280 Fed. 706; In re Johnson (1910, D. C. linn.) 176
Fed. 591. In re Brinson (1919, S. D. Bliss.) 262 Fed. 707; In re Pittman
(1921, E. D. N. C.) 275 Fed. 686; Holden v. Stratton (1905) 198 U. S. 202,
25 Sup. Ct. 656; In re Orear (1911, C. C. A. 8th) 189 Fed. 888; contra:
In re White (1909, C. C. A. 2d) 174 Fed. 333; In ro Samucls (1918, C. C. A.
2d) 254 Fed. 775; Cohn v. Malone, supra note 20; (1919Y 28 YumL LAW
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the exemption statutes of three states expressly include policies
wherein the power is reserved to change the beneficiary.
4
In protecting the interest of the dependent beneficiaries against
the consequences of wrongful acts by the insured, the legisla-
tures of some states have gone so far as to declare that neither
suicide of the insured nor his execution for crime shall defeat the
beneficiary's claim to payment.2 5 Probably the policy underlying
such legislation is to be found in unwillingness to give an unex-
pected profit to the insurer at the expense of the dependent bene-
ficiary.20 It is thus seen that the wife's interest in her husband's
policy is protected from the vicissitudes of her husband's busi-
ness, and from her husband's conduct. It is true enough that in
all the cases mentioned above, the insured's own funds, and not
misappropriated funds, were being used, but they serve to show
that life insurance has been treated differently because of its
functional aspects.
The courts have apparently had the notion that "trust princi-
ples" must be applied because misappropriated money is in-
volved.2 7  To take that position is to assume the very question at
issue, and to ignore the presence of countervailing considerations.
And the cause of the dependent beneficiary has further been im-
peded by the fear of the courts that fraud or dishonesty would
be given judicial sanction if the dependents of the embezzler are
to be permitted to recover the avails of the policies.2, The trus-
tee is not to be tempted into trying to make a profit from another's
funds.2 9  Yet everywhere except in New Jersey the trustee is
permitted to obtain some profit with another's funds when he
JOURNAL, 603. See also Patten, Insured Wife's Rights under General Ex-
emption Statutes (1923) 3 BosT. L. REV. 75.
24 Minn. Gen. Sts. 1910, secs. 3465, 3466; Pa. Laws, 1919, ch. 128, see.
1; Ohio Gen. Code, 1921, secs. 9394, 9395.
25 Mo. Rev. Sts., 1919, sec. 6150; Knights' Templar & Masons' Lifo
Endowments Co. v. Jarman (1902) 187 U. S. 197, 23 Sup. Ct. 108.
20 See Richards, Life Insurance-Suicide and Execution for Clime (1913)
22 YAL!z LAW JOURNAL, 292. •
27 "In this case, however, there is the fact which alters and colors the
whole transaction and is fundamental and controlling in its nature, and
that fact is that the monies which procured the insurance were trust
monies, and although invested in the policies, they were subject at the very
moment of such investment to the right of the owner of the funds to fol-
low them. . . ." Peckham, J., in Holmes v. Gilman, supra note 1, at
384, 34 N. E. at 209. "Without a disregard of these fundamental rules of
equity jurisprudence there is no logical or rational way of escape from the
conclusion of the court below that, when the insured paid with the funds
of the bank . . . he became a trustee ex maleficio." Sanborn, C. J.,
in Vorlander v. Keyes, supra note 1, at 70. See also Dayton v. Claflin Go.
(1896, Sup. Ct. Trial T.) 41 N. Y. Supp. 839, 850.
28 See Shaler v. Trowbridge, supra, note 1, at 604.
221 Perry, op. cit. supra note 4, at 91.
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mingles them with his own in wrongful investment.P Whether
or not permitting a recovery on the policy will encourage wrong-
doing is after all a matter of conjecture. The suppression of
crime is an office of the criminal law rather than the civil law;
the latter should not be shaped to encompass the ends of the
former. And if the decisions are to be sustained because of the
effect on crime, it would seem that the increase in value should go
to the state as a penalty.31 To say that the innocent wife must
be held to have adopted the acts of her husband,32 is to take a
position which is untenable in view of the modern development of
the law of domestic relations. 33
The defrauded person's recovery of the increased value of the
trust res in cases of constructive trusts has been aptly termed a
"windfall", 34 and in the case of ordinary investment of trust
property there seems to be no reason why he should not get it in
the absence of a better claim. But since in life insurance, the
increase over the misappropriated funds invested as premiums
would go to a person who gives nothing in return for it, it is sug-
gested that his claim has not as great equitable strength as that
of the dependent beneficiary. Moreover, in many cases the in-
vestment of part of the stolen money in insurance lulls the de-
pendents into a feeling of security, and prevents them from
taking out other insurance in some legitimate way.3 At any
rate, to give this "windfall" to the defrauded person without giv-
ing adequate consideration to the functional aspects of life insur-
ance is to fail to evaluate the situation properly.
3OBohle v. Hasselbroch (1902) 64 N. J. Eq. 334, 51 At. 503; see Ames,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 414.
31 It will be understood that the writer does not contend that this should
be done. Here, as elsewhere in this discussion, it is being attempted to show
that the courts have not been consistent in the position they have tahen.32 "His wife can derive, through so corrupt a source, no equitable rights
to these policies." Van Syckel, J., in Shaler v. Trowbridge, ompra note 1,
at 605; see also Dayton v. Ciafli Co., supra note 27, at 849.
-According to the prevalent view in the United States, responsibility is
not imposed on one spouse for the wrongs committed by the other. Sea
CO MI NTS (1925) 34 YArn LAW JOURNAL, 543, passim.
34 Ames, loc. cit. supra note 3.
35 It should be remembered that if the wife is to be deprived of the in-
surance money, she may have to be supported at the expense of the state:
if there are children, they may have to be reared in poverty. For a dis-
cussion of the manner in which the state is relieved of the burdens of
taking care of indigents, see Barnes, The Federal Taxation of Lifc Insr-
ance Companies (1917) (paper read before the Association of Life Insur-
ance Counsel).
